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Abstract—Multi-robot networks use wireless communication
to provide wide-ranging services such as aerial surveillance
and unmanned delivery. However, effective coordination between
multiple robots requires trust, making them particularly vulner-
able to cyber-attacks. Specifically, such networks can be gravely
disrupted by the Sybil attack, where even a single malicious robot
can spoof a large number of fake clients. This paper proposes a
new solution to defend against the Sybil attack, without requiring
expensive cryptographic key-distribution. Our core contribution
is a novel algorithm implemented on commercial Wi-Fi radios
that can “sense” spoofers using the physics of wireless signals. We
derive theoretical guarantees on how this algorithm bounds the
impact of the Sybil Attack on a broad class of robotic coverage
problems. We experimentally validate our claims using a team
of AscTec quadrotor servers and iRobot Create ground clients,
and demonstrate spoofer detection rates over 96%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-robot networks rely on wireless communication to
enable a wide range of tasks and applications: coverage [28,
6, 31], disaster management [7], surveillance [4], and consen-
sus [27] to name a few. The future promises an increasing trend
in this direction, such as delivery drones which transport goods
(e.g., Amazon Prime Air [2]) or traffic rerouting algorithms
(e.g., Google Maps Navigation) that rely on broadcasted
user locations to achieve their goals. Effective coordination,
however, requires trust. In order for these multi-robot systems
to perform their tasks optimally, transmitted data is often
assumed to be accurate and trustworthy; an assumption that
is easy to break. A particularly challenging attack on this
assumption is the so-called “Sybil attack.”
In a Sybil attack a malicious agent generates (or spoofs)
a large number of false identities to gain a disproportionate
influence in the network.1 These attacks are notoriously easy
to implement [33] and can be detrimental to multi-robot
networks. An example of this is coverage, where an adversarial
client can spoof a cluster of clients in its vicinity in order
to create a high local demand, in turn denying service to
legitimate clients (Figure 1). Although a vast body of literature
is dedicated to cybersecurity in general multi-node networks
(e.g., a wired LAN), the same is not true for multi-robot net-
works [15, 30], leaving them largely vulnerable to attack. This
is because many characteristics unique to robotic networks
make security more challenging; for example, traditional key
passing or cryptographic authentication is difficult to maintain
1Please refer to [8, 26] for a detailed treatment of this class of cyber attacks.
Fig. 1: Sybil Attack on Coverage: A server robot provides loca-
tional coverage to legitimate clients when no attack is present. In a
Sybil attack, an adversary spoofs many fake clients to draw away
coverage from the legitimate clients.
due to the highly dynamic and distributed nature of multi-robot
teams where clients often enter and exit the network.
This paper addresses the challenge of guarding against Sybil
attacks in multi-robot networks. We focus on the general
class of problems where a group of server robots coordinate
to provide some service using the broadcasted locations of
a group of client robots. Our core contribution is a novel
algorithm that analyzes the received wireless signals to detect
the presence of spoofed clients spawned by adversaries. We
call this a “virtual spoofer sensor” as we do not use specialized
hardware nor encrypted key exchange, but rather a commercial
Wi-Fi card and software to implement our solution. Our virtual
sensor leverages the rich physical information already present
in wireless signals. At a high level, as wireless signals prop-
agate, they interact with the environment via scattering and
absorption from objects along the traversed paths. Carefully
processed, these signals can provide a unique signature or
“spatial fingerprint” for each client, measuring the power of
the signal received along each spatial direction (Fig. 2). Unlike
message contents such as reported IDs or locations which ad-
versaries can manipulate, spatial fingerprints rely on physical
signal interactions that cannot be exactly predicted [13, 24].
Using these derived fingerprints, we show that a confidence
weight, α ∈ (0, 1) can be obtained for each client in the
network. We prove that these confidence weights have a
desirable property where legitimate clients have an expected
confidence weight close to one, while spoofed clients will have
an expected confidence weight close to zero. A particularly
attractive feature of confidence weight α is that it can be
readily integrated as a per-client weighting function into a
wide variety of multi-robot controllers. More importantly, the
analytical bounds on these weights can provably limit the ill-
effects of spoofers on the performance of these controllers.
This paper demonstrates this capability in the context of the
Fig. 2: Spatial Fingerprints: A quadrotor server measures the
directional signal strength of each client (here, simplified to 2-D).
The blue client has one line-of-sight peak; the other, 2 signal paths.
well-known locational coverage algorithm [6, 31].
We provide an extensive experimental evaluation of our
theoretical claims using a heterogeneous team of air/ground
robots consisting of two AscTec Hummingbird platforms and
ten iRobot Create platforms. We conduct our experiments
in general indoor settings with randomly placed clients and
demonstrate a spoofer detection rate of 96%. For the case of
coverage we find that the converged positions of the service
robots is on average 3 cm from optimal even when more than
75% of total clients in the network are spoofed.
Contributions of this paper: We develop a virtual sensor for
spoofing detection which provides performance guarantees in
the presence of Sybil attacks and is applicable to a broad class
of problems in distributed robotics. We show that the influence
of spoofers is analytically bounded under our system in a
coverage context, where each robotic node providing coverage
remains within a radius of its position in the absence of an
attack. Our theoretical results are validated extensively through
experiments in diverse settings.
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of Sybil attacks has been studied in general
multi-node, often static, networks, and many tools have been
developed for these settings. Past work falls under three
categories: (1) Cryptographic authentication schemes can be
used to prevent Sybil attacks (Table 7 in [39]). These re-
quire trusted central authorities and computationally expensive
distributed key management, to account for dynamic clients
that enter and leave the network [39]. (2) Non-cryptographic
techniques in the wireless networking community leverage
wireless physical-layer information to detect spoofed client
identities or falsified locations [16, 42, 40, 41]. These rely
on bulky and expensive hardware like large multi-antenna
arrays, that cannot be mounted on small robotic platforms.
(3) Recent techniques have attempted to use wireless signal
information like received signal strength (RSSI) [37, 29] and
channel state information [22]. Such techniques need clients
to remain static, since mobility can cause wireless channels
to fluctuate rapidly [3]. In addition, they are susceptible to
power-scaling attacks, where clients scale power differently to
imitate different users. In sum, the above systems share one or
more of the following characteristics making them ill-suited
to multi-robot networks: (1) require computationally-intensive
key management; (2) rely on bulky and expensive hardware;
(3) assume static networks. Indeed past work has highlighted
the gravity and apparent sparsity of solutions to cyber-security
threats in multi-robot networks [15, 30, 5].
Unlike past work, our solution has three attributes that
particularly suit multi-robot networks. (1) It captures physical
properties of wireless signals and therefore does not require
distributed key management. (2) It relies on cheap commodity
Wi-Fi radios, unlike hardware-based solutions [40, 42]. (3) It
is robust to client mobility and power-scaling attacks.
Finally, our system builds on Synthetic Aperture Radar
(SAR) to construct signal fingerprints [9]. SAR has been
widely used for radar imaging [9, 17] and indoor position-
ing [19, 18, 36, 12]. In contrast, this paper builds upon SAR
to provide cyber-security to multi-robot networks. In doing
so, it provides theoretical security guarantees that are validated
experimentally. These integrate readily with performance guar-
antees of existing multi-robot controllers, like the well-known
robotic coverage controllers [6, 31] as shown in Sec. §VI.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This paper focuses on problems where the knowledge of
agent positions facilitates some collaborative task. Specifically,
it assumes two groups of agents, “clients” requiring some type
of location-based service such as coverage or goods delivery
and “servers” whose positions are optimized in order to pro-
vide the service to its clients. Let P := {p1, . . . , pc} denote the
client positions in R3. LetX := {x1, . . . , xm} be the positions
of the servers in R3 and the notation [m] = {1, . . . ,m} denote
their indices. We consider the case where a subset of the
clients, S ⊂ P (with s := |S|) are “spoofed” clients.
Definition 3.1 (Spoofed Client): A single malicious client
may generate multiple unique identities, each with a fabricated
position. Each generated, or “spawned” identity is considered
a spoofed client. By spoofing multiple clients, the malicious
client gains a disproportionate influence in the network. All
clients which are not spoofed are considered legitimate clients.
Threat Model: Our threat model considers one or more
adversarial robot clients with one Wi-Fi antenna each. The
adversaries can be mobile and scale power on a per-packet ba-
sis. We only consider adversarial clients.2 Adversarial clients
perform the “Sybil Attack” to forge packets emulating s non-
existent clients, where s can exceed the number of legitimate
clients. More formally:
Definition 3.2 (Sybil Attack): Define a network of client
and server positions as P ∪X , where a subset S of the clients
are spoofed, such that P = S ∪ S˜. We assume that set P is
known but knowledge of which clients are spoofed (i.e., in S)
is unknown. This attack is called a “Sybil Attack.”
To counter the Sybil attack, this paper has two objectives.
First, we find a relation capturing directional signal strength
between a client i and a server l. We seek a mapping
Fil : [0, π2 ] × [0, 2π] 7→ R such that for any 3D direction
(θ, φ) defined in Fig. 4, the value Fil(θ, φ) is the power of
2The case of adversarial server robots is left for future work although many
of the concepts in the current paper are extensible to this case as well.
the received signal from client i along that direction. Using
this mapping, or “fingerprint”, our first problem is to derive a
confidence weight whose expectation is provably bounded near
1 for legitimate clients and near 0 for spoofed clients. Further,
we wish to find these bounds analytically from problem pa-
rameters like the signal-to-noise ratio of the received wireless
signal. We summarize this objective as Problem 1 below:
Problem 1: Spoofer Detection Let Fi be the set of finger-
prints measured from all clients j ∈ [c] and servers l ∈ [m] in
the neighborhood, Ni, of client i.3 Here, a neighborhood of
client i, Ni, are all agents that can receive Wi-Fi transmissions
sent by client i. Using Fi, derive a confidence weight αi(Fi) ∈
(0, 1) and a threshold ωi(σ2i ) > 0 where σ
2
i represents error
variances such as the signal-to-noise ratio that are assumed
to be given. Find ωi(·) to have the provable property of
differentiating spoofed clients whereby spoofed clients are
bounded below this threshold, i.e., E[αi] ≤ ω, and legitimate
clients are bounded above this threshold E[αi] ≥ 1− ω.
Our second objective is to apply our spoofer detection method
to multi-robot control problems. We consider the well-known
coverage problem in [6, 31]. We show that by integrating
the confidence weight from Problem 1, we can analytically
bound the error in performance caused by spoofed clients
in the network. We consider the coverage problem where
an importance function is defined over an environment and
where the positions of the clients correspond to peaks in
the importance function. Here, servers position themselves
to maximize their proximity to these peaks, to improve their
coverage over client robots. If CV = {x∗1, . . . , x∗m} is the set of
server positions optimized by the coverage controller with zero
spoofers, we wish to guarantee that server positions optimized
with spoofers present, CVα , is “close” to CV . We state this
second objective more specifically as Problem 2 below:
Problem 2: Sybil-resillience in Multi-Robot Coverage
Consider a locational coverage problem where an importance
function ρ(q) > 0 is defined over an environment Q ⊂ R3
and q ∈ Q. Specifically, consider an importance function that
can be decomposed into terms, ρi(q), depending on each
client’s position, i ∈ [c] (for example, each client position
corresponds to a peak), i.e., ρ(q) = ρ1(q) + . . . + ρc(q). Let
CV = {x∗1, . . . , x∗m} be the set of server positions returned
by an optimization of ρ(q) over X , where there are zero
spoofed clients in the network. Under a Sybil attack, let
CVα = {x1, . . . , xm} be the set of server positions returned
by an optimization of an α-modified importance function
ρ(q) = α1ρ1(q)+ . . .+αcρc(q) where the importance weight
terms αi satisfy the bounds stated in Problem 1. We wish to
find an ǫ(P) > 0 such that the set CVα is within a distance
ǫ(P) to CV . CVα is within a distance ǫ(P) to CV if ∀x ∈ CVα
there exists a unique y ∈ CV where dist(x, y) < ǫ(P). Here,
P is a set of problem parameters that we wish to find.
3Detecting if a client i is spoofed becomes easier given more servers
communicating with i (i.e., a larger neighborhood Ni). But even with a single
server, this determination can be made. A theoretical treatment of this point is
given in Sec. §V and experimental results (§VII-A) use as little as one server.
Intuitively, solutions to Problem 2 guarantee that under a Sybil
attack, all server positions computed using an α-modified
coverage controller are within a computable distance ǫ(P)
from their optimal positions (i.e., in the absence of spoofers).
Sec. §VI derives a closed-form for ǫ(P) and shows the set
P of problem parameters to be the number of spoofers, the
footprint of the environment covered, and signal noise.
IV. FINGERPRINTS TO DETECT MALICIOUS CLIENTS
Here we construct a fingerprint, a directional signal strength
profile for a communicating server-client pair. Our choice
of signal fingerprints have many desirable properties that
enable us to derive a robust spoof-detection metric: they 1)
capture directional information of the transmitted signal source
and thus are well-suited for flagging falsely reported client
positions, 2) can be obtained for a single server-client pair,
unlike location estimation techniques such as triangulation
which require multiple servers to coordinate, 3) cannot be ma-
nipulated by the client, since the occurrence of each signal path
is due to environment reflections, 4) are applicable in complex
multipath environments where a transmitted signal is scattered
off of walls and objects;since these scattered signals manifest
themselves as measurable peaks in the fingerprint, complex
multipath contributes significantly to fingerprint uniqueness.
We construct fingerprints using wireless channels h, com-
plex numbers measurable on any wireless device characteriz-
ing the attenuation in power and the phase rotation that signals
experience as they propagate over the air. These channels
also capture the fact that wireless signals are scattered by the
environment, arriving at the receiver over (potentially) several
different paths [35]. Fig. 3 is an example 2D schematic of
a wireless signal traversing from a client robot to a server
robot arriving along two separate paths: one attenuated direct
path at 40◦ and one reflected at 60◦. If the server robot had a
directional antenna, it could obtain a full 3D profile of power
of the received signal (i.e., |h|2) along every spatial direction.
We use such a 3-D profile as a “spatial fingerprint” that can
help distinguish between different clients.
Unfortunately directional antennas are composed of large
arrays of many antennas that are too bulky for small agile robot
platforms. Luckily, a well-known technique called Synthetic
Aperture Radar [9] (SAR) can be used to emulate such an
antenna using a commodity Wi-Fi radio. Its key idea is to use
small local robotic motion, such as spinning in-place, to obtain
multiple snapshots of the wireless channel that are then pro-
cessed like a directional array of antennas. SAR can be imple-
mented using a well-studied signal processing algorithm called
MUSIC [14] to obtain spatial fingerprints at each server robot.
Mathematically, we obtain a spatial fingerprint for each
wireless link between a server l and client i as a matrix
Fil : R× R → R. For each spatial path represented as (θ, φ)
(see Fig. 4), Fij maps to a scalar value representing the signal
power received along that path. More formally:
Fil(φ, θ) = 1/|Eign(hˆilhˆ†il)e
√−1Ψil(φ,θ)|2 (1)
Where hˆil is a vector of the ratio of wireless channel snapshots
between two antennas mounted on the body of the server l and
Fig. 3: Example Signal Fingerprint: (a) A
server (×) receives a client ( ) signal on 2
paths: direct along 40◦ attenuated by an obstacle
(shaded) and reflected by a wall along 60◦. (b) is
a corresponding fingerprint: peak heights at 40◦
and 60◦ correspond to their relative attenuations.
Fig. 4: 3-D Angles: The figure depicts the
notation for the azimuthal angle φ and polar angle
θ for the direct path from a ground client ( ) to
aerial server robot (×) in 3 dimensions. More
generally, the set of all angles between client i
and server l are denoted as Φil , Θil respectively.
Symbol Meaning
m, c, s No. of servers, clients, spoofers
pi, xl Position of client i / server l
Fil, k Fingerprint of i at l, k peaks
hˆil M × 1 channel ratios of i to l
f(· ;µ, σ2) PDF of normal distribution
g(· ;µ, σ2) min(1,√2πf(x;µ, σ2))
κ Constant = ((
√
2 +
√
π)/π)2
αi, βi confidence, honesty metric of i
γij Similarity metric of client i, j
SNR Signal-to-noise ratio
RSSI Received Signal Strength
σ2θ , σ
2
φ Variance in peak shifts of Fil
σˆ2θ , σˆ
2
φ σ
2
θ , σ
2
φ plus measurement error
CVL , CVα Coverage centroid of optimal, our
system; error ~e within ǫ
L(Q), ρ(q) Footprint, Mass function
Fig. 5: Table of Most Common Notations
Ψil(φ, θ) = 2πrλ cos(φ−Bl) sin(θ−Γl), λ is the wavelength
of the signal and r is the distance between the antennas,
Bl,Γl are the server’s angular orientation, Eign(·) are noise
eigenvectors, (·)† is conjugate transpose, and k is the number
of signal eigenvectors, equal to the number of paths.
While our above formulation is derived from MUSIC [14],
it varies in one important way: while MUSIC uses a single-
antenna channel snapshot hil, we use the channel ratio hˆil =
h1il/h2il between two antennas. This modification provides
resilience to intentional power scaling by the sender since
scaling his transmit power by χ yields a measured ratio
hˆil = χh1il/(χh2il); a value unaffected by power scaling.
V. CONSTRUCTING A CLIENT CONFIDENCE WEIGHT
Given a client fingerprint Fil(φ, θ) for each client i relative
to a robotic server l, we wish to generate a confidence weight
αi ∈ [0, 1] that approaches 1 for legitimate clients, and 0
otherwise. We achieve this by defining αi as the product
of two terms βi and γij that go to 0 if a client reports a
falsified location or has the same fingerprint as another client
j respectively. In particular, βi is termed the honesty metric
and is the likelihood (Eq. (2)) that client i is indeed along its
reported direction (φil, θil) with respect to each server l in its
neighborhood. The second term γij is the similarity metric -
the likelihood that client i’s fingerprint as seen by server l is
not unique compared to that of a different client j of server
l. Finally, αi is the product of 1) βi and 2) (1 − γij) over
all j 6= i, which compares client i’s fingerprint with all other
clients in its neighborhood and approaches 0 if client i’s profile
is not unique. Therefore if either the honesty term or similarity
term goes to 0, the weight αi for client i also approaches zero.
αi = βi
∏
j 6=i
(1− γij) where, βi =
∏
l∈Ni
L(i is at (φil, θil)|Fil)
γij =
∏
l∈Ni
L(i spoofs j|Fil, Fjl) (2)
Here, L(·) denotes an event likelihood, (φil, θil) is the
reported direction of client i with respect to server l, and the
neighborhood Ni are servers communicating with client i.
Defining Honesty and Similarity Metrics: The honesty
metric βi and similarity metric γij are derived using peak
locations in client fingerprints. In practice however, peaks
may have slight shifts owing to noise. Thus, any comparison
between peak locations must permit some variance due to
these shifts. Fortunately, noise in wireless environments can
be modeled closely as additive white-Gaussian [35]. As the
following lemma shows, this results in peak shifts that are
also Gaussian, meaning that their variance is easy to model
and account for. More formally, the lemma states that shifts are
normally distributed with zero mean and well-defined variance,
based on the wireless medium’s signal-to-noise ratio (SNR):
Lemma 5.1: Let ∆θi,∆φi denote the error between the
azimuthal and polar angle of the uncorrelated ith path of a
(potentially multipath) source and the corresponding angles
of the (local) maximum in the fingerprint F (φ, θ), over
several uniformly gathered packets (i.e., SAR snapshots) for
θ ∈ (10◦, 80◦). Then ∆θi and ∆φi are normally distributed
with a mean 0, and expected variance σ2φ and σ
2
θ :
σ2θ = σ
2
φ =9λ
2/(8Mπ2r2SNR)
Where, λ is the wavelength of the signal, SNR is the signal-
to-noise ratio in the network4, M is the number of packets
per-rotation, and r is the distance between the antennas. 
The above lemma follows from well-known Cramer-Rao
bounds [25, 11, 10] shown previously for linear antenna
movements in SAR [34] but readily extensible to circular
rotations (proof in supplementary text [1]). Using this lemma,
we can define the honesty metric βi as the likelihood that the
client is at its reported location, subject to this Gaussian error
and additional measurement error in reported locations.
Definition 5.2: (βi) Let φFil and θFil denote the closest
maximum in Fil(φ, θ) to (φil, θil). We denote σˆ2φ and σˆ
2
θ as
the variances in angles σ2φ and σ
2
θ plus any variance due to
measurement error of reported locations that can be calibrated
from device hardware. We define βi for client i as:
βi =
∏
l
g(φil − φFil ; 0, σˆ2φ)× g(θil − θFil ; 0, σˆ2θ) (3)
Where g(x;µ, σ2) = min(1,
√
2πf(x;µ, σ2)) is a normalized
Gaussian PDF f(x;µ, σ2) with mean µ and variance σ2. 
4For clarity, we drop dependence on i, l for SNR, σθ and σφ
In practice, reported client locations are subject to measure-
ment errors due to position sensor inaccuracies. Our definition
of βi above accounts for this by using the effective variances
σˆ2φ and σˆ
2
θ that are the sum of the variance in angles, σ
2
φ and
σ2θ , in addition to the variances due to measurement error.
Using Lemma 5.1 we define the similarity metric γij as the
likelihood that two client fingerprints share identical peaks:
Definition 5.3: (γij) Let (Φil,Θil) and (Φjl,Θjl) denote
the set of local maxima, ordered by non-decreasing angle
values, in fingerprints Fil and Fjl. We define γij for client
i relative to client j as:
γij =
∏
φi∈Φil,φj∈Φjl
g(φi − φj ; 0, 2σ2φ)
∏
θi∈Θil,θj∈Θjl
g(θi − θj ; 0, 2σ2θ) (4)
Where g(·;µ, σ2) is from Definition. 5.2, and the factor of 2
in the variance accounts for computing the difference of two
normally distributed values. 
Defining the Confidence Weight: We notice that Eqn. 2, 3
and 4 fully define αi for each client i. In summary, the
confidence weight is computed in three steps: (1) Obtain the
client fingerprint using SAR on wireless signal snapshots.
(2) Measure the variance of peak locations of these client
fingerprints using their Signal-to-Noise Ratio. (3) Compute the
similarity and honesty metrics using their above definitions to
obtain the confidence weight. Algorithm 1 below summarizes
the steps to construct αi for a given client i.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to Compute Client Confidence Weight
⊲ Input: Ratio of Channels hˆil and SNR
⊲ Output: Confidence Weight, αi for client i
⊲ Step (1): Measure fingerprints for client i
for l = 1, . . . ,m do
for φ ∈ {0◦, . . . , 360◦}; θ ∈ {0◦, . . . , 360◦} do
Find Fil(φ, θ) using a single spin to get hˆil (Eqn. 1)
end for
end for
⊲ Step (2): Measure variances in peak locations using SNR
σ2θ = σ
2
φ = Apply Lemma 5.1 SNR
⊲ Step (3): Find honesty, similarity and confidence weight
βi = Apply Defn. 5.2 using σ2θ , σ
2
φ, peaks of Fil
for j = {1, . . . , c} \ {i} do
γij = Apply Defn. 5.3 using σ2θ , σ
2
φ, peaks of Fil, Fjl
end for
αi = βi
∏
j 6=i(1− γij)
We now present our main result that solves Problem 1 in the
problem statement (Sec. §III). The following theorem says the
expected αi’s of legitimate nodes approach 1, while those of
spoofers approach 0, allowing us to discern them under well-
defined assumptions: (A.1) The signal paths are independent.
(A.2) Errors in azimuth and polar angles are independent.
(A.3) The clients transmit enough packets to emulate a large
antenna array (in practice, 25− 30 packets per second).5
Theorem 5.4: Consider a network with m servers and c
clients. A new client i either: 1) spoofs s clients reporting
5This is a mild requirement since 25 − 30 packets can be transmitted in
tens of milliseconds, even at the lowest data rate of 6Mb/s of 802.11n Wi-Fi.
a random location, potentially scaling power, or; 2) is a
uniformly randomly located legitimate client. Let αspoof ,
αlegit be the confidence weights in either case. Assume that
the client obtains its signals from servers along k paths (where
the number of paths k is defined by Eqn. §1 in Sec. §IV).
Under A.1-A.3, the expected αspoof , αlegit are bounded by:
E[αspoof ] ≤
[√
σˆθσˆφκ
]m
[2mkσθσφ]s
E[αlegit] ≥ 1− cmσˆθσˆφ
[√
2σθσφκ
]mk
(5)
Where κ =
(
(
√
2 +
√
π)/π
)2
, σθ , σφ, σˆθ , σˆφ are the variances
defined in Lemma 5.1 that depend on signal-to-noise ratio (the
latter include measurement error in reported locations).
Proof Sketch: To give some intuition on why the theorem
holds, we provide a brief proof sketch (proof in supplementary
text [1]). To begin with, notice from their definitions that both
the honesty metric βi and confidence metric γij inspect peaks
in fingerprints Fil (Lemma 5.1). For the honesty metric βi
of a legitimate node, this peak location should be normally
distributed (subject to noise, measurement error) around the
reported location. For a spoofer that reports a random location,
the peak location is uniformly distributed. A similar (but
inverse) argument holds for γij . Hence, we simply need to
show is that the definitions of βi and γi which are both
products of the form g(X) can be bounded in expectation
if X is uniform or normally distributed.
To this end, consider two random variables u and ν which
are respectively uniform and normally distributed between 0
and 2π with mean 0 and variance σ2. Let S =
√
2σ(ln 1σ )
0.5,
the value at which the minimization in g(x) is triggered.
E[g(ν)] and E[g(u)] are as follows:
E[g(ν)] =
∫ S
−S
f(x; 0, σ2)dx+
√
8π
∫ −S
−∞
[f(x; 0;σ2)]2dx
≥
∫ S
−S
f(x; 0, σ2)dx = erf
(
S
σ
√
2
)
≥ 1− σ (6)
Where erf(·) is the well known Error function and using
1−erf(x) < e−x2 . Similarly, we can evaluate E[u(n)] as:
E[g(u)] =
∫ S
−S
1
2π
dx+ 2
√
2π
∫ −S
−2π
1
2π
f(x; 0;σ2)dx
≤ S
π
+
1√
2π
(
1− erf( S
σ
√
2
)
)
≤ √σκ (7)
By assumptions A.1-A.3, we can apply these bounds to
write the expectation of the honesty metric βi as a product
of those of the independent variables:
E[βspoof ] =
∏
l
E[g(u; 0, σˆ2φ)]E[g(u; 0, σˆ
2
θ)] ≤
[√
σˆθσˆφκ
]m
E[βlegit ] =
∏
l
E[g(ν; 0, σˆ2φ)]E[g(ν; 0, σˆ
2
θ)] ≥ 1−mσˆθσˆφ
Applying a similar argument, the similarity metric γ is:
E[γspoof ] =
k∏
p=1
E[f(ν; 0, 2σ2φ)f(ν; 0, 2σ
2
θ)] ≥ 1− 2mkσθσφ
E[γlegit] =
k∏
p=1
E[g(u; 0, 2σ2φ)g(u; 0, 2σ
2
θ)] ≤
[√
2σθσφκ
]mk
Combining the above equations, we prove Eqn. 5. 
A natural question one might ask is if the above lemma
holds in general environments, where its assumptions A.1-A.3
may be too stringent. Our extensive experimental results in
Sec. VII show that our bounds on α approximately predict
performance in general environments. Further, Sec. §VII-A
shows that results from an anechoic chamber, which emulate
free-space conditions where the lemma’s assumptions can be
directly enforced, tightly follow the bounds of Lemma 5.1.
In sum, one can adopt the above lemma to distinguish
adversarial nodes from legitimate nodes, purely based on α.
However, an interesting alternative is to incorporate α directly
into multi-robot controllers to give provable service guarantees
to legitimate nodes. The next section show how αi readily
integrates with robotic coverage controllers, in particular.
VI. THREAT-RESISTANT DISTRIBUTED CONTROL
This section describes how our spoof detection method
from Sec. §V integrates with well-known coverage controllers
from [6, 31, 32]. The area coverage problem deals with
positioning server robots to minimize their Euclidean distance
to certain areas of interest in the environment. These areas
are determined by an importance function ρ(q) that is defined
over the environment Q ⊂ R3 of size L(Q). For our coverage
problem, the peaks of the importance are determined by client
positions P , e.g., ρ(q, P ) = ρ1(q) + . . . + ρc(q) where ρi(q)
quantifies the influence of client i’s position on the importance
function. Using [6, 31, 32], server robot positions optimizing
coverage over ρ(q, P ) will minimize their distance to clients.
To account for spoofed clients, we modify the importance
function ρ(q, P ) using the αi for each client i ∈ [c] that
is computed by Algorithm 1. E.g., we can multiply each
client-term in ρ(q, P ) by its corresponding confidence weight:
ρ(q, P )α = α1ρ1(q) + . . . + αcρc(q). Given the properties
of these weights derived in Theorem 5.4, i.e., αi is bounded
near zero for a spoofed client and near one for a legitimate
client, the effect of multiplication by the α’s is that terms
corresponding to spoofed clients will be bounded to a small
value (see Fig. 6); providing resilience to the spoofing attack.
For simplicity, we assume the importance function ρ(q) is
static (from [6]) and α’s from Algorithm 1 are computed once,
at the beginning of the coverage algorithm. We note that our
approach readily extends to the adaptive case in [31, 32] when
the importance function (and location of clients) change, by
having the service robots exchange their learned importance
function. This in turn can trigger a re-calculation of α values.
We now show that computed server positions are impacted
by spoofers to within a closed-form bound, that depends on
Fig. 6: Coverage guarantee: An ǫ ball around the ground-truth centroid,
CVlegitimate , is shown in green. Theorem 6.1 finds ǫ(P) so that server positions
remain in this ball in the presence of spoofed clients.
problem parameters like signal-to-noise ratio. Theorem 6.1
below solves Problem 2 of our problem statement (Sec. §III).
Theorem 6.1: Let X be a set of server robot positions and
P = S ∪ S˜ be a set of client positions where S is the set
of spoofed client positions, and S˜ is the set of legitimate
clients. The identities of the clients being spoofed is assumed
unknown. Let {α1, . . . , αc} be a set of confidence weights sat-
isfying Theorem 5.4 and assume a known importance function
ρ(q, P ) = ρ1(q)+ . . .+ρc(q) that is defined over the environ-
ment Q ⊂ R3 of size L(Q). Define CV = {x∗1, . . . , x∗m} to be
the set of server positions optimized over ρ(q, S˜), i.e., where
there are zero spoofed clients and CVα to be the set of server
positions optimized over ρ(q, P )α = α1ρ1(q) + . . .+αcρc(q)
where there is at least one spoofed client, ie. |S| ≥ 1. If
{α1, . . . , αc} satisfy Theorem 5.4, we have that ∀x ∈ CVα
there exists a unique y ∈ CV , where in the expected case
dist(x, y) ≤ ǫ(m, s, σφ, σθ, κ)
ǫ = max
{
[
√
σˆθσˆφκ]
m[2mkσθσφ]
s, cmσˆθσˆφ[
√
2σθσφκ]
mk
}
L(Q)
andm, s, σφ, σθ, κ are problem parameters as in Theorem 5.4.
Proof: We make an important observation that E[αi] ≤ a
if client i is a spoofed node, and E[αi] ≥ b otherwise; hence:
ρ(q, P )α = a(ρ1(q) + . . .+ ρs(q)) + b(ρs+1(q) + . . .+ ρc(q))
is the maximal effect that the presence of spoofed clients
can have on the importance function. Intuitively, all spoofed
clients have a weight of at maximum a and all legitimate
clients have a reduced weight of at minimum b. Using this
observation we can bound the influence of the spoofed clients
on computed server control inputs (see Fig. 6). Specifically,
recall from [6] that the position control for each server is:
ul = −2MV (CV − cl), where MV =
∫
V
ρ(q)dq, CV =
1
Mv
∫
V qρ(q)dq and V is the voronoi partition for server l
defined as all points q ∈ Q with dist(q, xl) < dist(q, xg) where
g 6= l. Using the importance function from above we can write
CVα =
1
MVα
(aCVS + bCVL) where CVS is the component
of the centroid computed over spoofed nodes and CVL is the
component of the centroid computed over legitimate nodes and
MVα is defined shortly. We rewrite CVS as a perturbation of
the centroid over legitimate nodes as CVS = CVL+~v‖~e‖ where
~v is an arbitrary unit vector and the magnitude of ~e can be as
large as the length of the operative environment,‖~e‖ ≤ L(Q).
Let the total mass be T = MVs+MVL . We can write a similar
expression for the mass MVα using the bounds a and b as
MVα = bT + (a− b)MVL . Substituting these expressions into
CVα and simplifying gives CVα =
CVL+b~v‖~e‖
bT+(a−b)MVL
. Combining
this expression with the server control input:
ul = k ( [(a+ b)CVL − pl] + b‖~e‖~v ) (8)
Where k = −2(bT + aMVL). If (a + b) = 1, this
control input drives the server robot l to a neighbor-
hood of size ǫ = b‖~e‖ ≤ bL(Q) centered around
the centroid CL defined over the legitimate clients. So if
b = max
{
[
√
σˆθσˆφκ]m[2mkσθσφ]s, cmσˆθσˆφ[
√
2σθσφκ]mk
}
from Theorem 5.4 Equation (5), then:
ǫ = max
{
[
√
σˆθσˆφκ]
m[2mkσθσφ]
s, cmσˆθσˆφ[
√
2σθσφκ]
mk
}
L(Q)
then we have (a+ b) = 1 as desired, proving the lemma. 
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section describes our results from an experimental
evaluation of our theoretical claims. Our aerial servers were
Fig. 10: Test system.
implemented on two AscTec Atom-
board computing platforms equipped
with Intel 5300 Wi-Fi cards with two
antennas each, mounted on two As-
cTec Hummingbird quadrotors. Our
clients were ten iRobot Create robots,
each equipped with Asus EEPC net-
books and single-antenna Wi-Fi cards. An adversarial client
forged multiple identities by spawning multiple packets con-
taining different identities (up to 75% of the total number of
legitimate clients in the system), and could use a different
transmit power for each identity. The adversary advertised
identities by modifying the Wi-Fi MAC field, a common
technique for faking multiple identities [33].
Evaluation: We evaluate our system in two environments: 1)
An indoor multipath-rich environment with walls and obstacles
equipped with a Vicon motion capture system to aid quadrotor
navigation; 2) An anechoic chamber to emulate a free-space
setting that is particularly challenging to our system. We
estimated the average theoretical expected standard deviation
to be σθ, σφ of 0.7◦ (Lemma 5.1). After including the standard
deviation in reported location, based on the known errors of
our localization framework, this increased the average σˆθ, σˆφ
by 2◦(variances in each experiment depend on measured SNR)
We compare our system against a baseline that uses a Received
Signal Strength (RSSI) comparison (akin to [29]).
Roadmap: We conduct three classes of experiments: (1) Mi-
crobenchmarks to validate our client confidence metric, both in
free-space and multipath indoor environments (Sec. §VII-A).
(2) Experiments applying this confidence metric to quarantine
adversaries (Sec. §VII-B). (3) Application of our system to se-
cure the coverage problem against Sybil attacks (Sec. §VII-C).
A. Microbenchmarks on the Confidence Metric
This experiment studies the correctness of our system’s
confidence metric α. Recall from theory in §V that α’s
measured by a server robot distinguish between unique clients
based on their diverse physical directions and the presence
of multipath reflections. Thus, a free-space environment (i.e.,
with no multipath) is particularly challenging to our system.
Method: To approximate free-space, we measured α values in
a radio-frequency anechoic chamber which attenuates reflected
paths by about 60 dB, for a legitimate and malicious client
from one server robot 12 m away. Next, in a 10 m x 8 m indoor
room (a typical multipath case), we measured α’s from one
server for up to ten legitimate clients and ten spoofed clients.
Results: In Fig. 7, the values of α in the anechoic cham-
ber tightly follow our theoretical bounds in Theorem 5.4
(Fig. 8(c)). As expected, our results in indoor multipath
environments exhibit a larger variance but follow the trend
suggested by theory. Further, we stress our confidence metric
by isolating the case of colinearity in both environments. In
Fig. 8, we consider a spoofing adversary initially co-aligned
with a legitimate client, and measure α as the angle of
separation, φ, is increased from 0◦ to 20◦ relative to the server
robot. In the anechoic chamber at φ close to 0◦, the fingerprints
of both the legitimate and adversarial nodes are virtually
identical, each with precisely one peak at 0◦. Consequently,
α for the legitimate node is much below 1, indicating that is
believed to be adversarial (i.e., the term 1−γ in α approaches
0 in Eqn. 2). However, α for the legitimate client quickly
approaches 1, even if φ = 3◦ in the anechoic chamber. In
fact, α is virtually identical to 1 beyond 10◦, indicating that a
single server robot can distinguish closely aligned legitimate
and adversarial clients even in free-space. Fig. 8b shows that
multipath can distinguish clients even at φ = 0◦, due to
additional reflected paths that help disambiguate these clients.
B. Performance of Sybil Attack Detection
In this experiment, we measure our system’s classification
performance on legitimate and spoofed clients, in the presence
of static, mobile, and power-scaling adversaries.
Method: This experiment was performed in the multipath-rich
indoor testbed with walls and obstacles. Each run consisted of
one quadrotor server, and (randomly positioned) ten control
clients, or nine legitimate clients with an adversary reporting
two to nine spoofed clients. Each Sybil attack was performed
under three modalities: (1) a stationary attacker with a fixed
transmission power, (2) a mobile attacker (random-walk and
linear movements), and (3) an attacker scaling the per-packet
power by a different amount for each spoofed client, from
1 to 31 mW. The quadrotor server classifies clients with an
α < 0.5 as spoofed (see Fig. 7). The baseline RSSI classifier
uses a 2 dB thresholded minimum dissimilarity, a technique
previously applied in static networks [29, 37].
Results: For each modality, our performance against an RSSI
baseline over multiple network topologies is summarized here
Our System RSSI
TPR FPR TPR FPR
Static 96.3 3.0 81.5 9.1
Mobile 96.3 6.1 85.2 6.1
∆ mW 100.0 3.0 74.1 27.3
as true positive
rates (TPR) and
false positive rates
(FPR). In particu-
lar, our classifier
is robust to power-
scaling Sybil at-
tacks (where RSSI performs poorly) since we use the ratio of
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Fig. 7: Experimental Evaluation of α: (a) In an anechoic chamber
approximating our assumptions A.1-A.3 (§5.4), α largely agrees with theory.
(b) in a typical multipath environment, experimental results closely follow
theoretical predictions. Data shows that α = 0.5 is a good threshold value.
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Fig. 8: Co-Aligned Clients: We vary the angle φ between a legitimate
and malicious client, relative to a single server and plot α, in (a) an anechoic
chamber and (b) an indoor environment. The minimum φ needed to distinguish
the clients is only: (a) 3◦ in freespace, (b) 0◦ in multipath settings.
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Fig. 9: Experimental Results for Sybil Attack in Multi-Agent Coverage: Depicts the total distance of converged quadrotor server positions (white ×)
to legitimate clients ( ) and six spoofed clients ( ). We consider: (a) an insecure system where each spoofed client creates a false peak in the importance
function, (b) a ground truth importance function, and (c) our system where applying α weights from Algorithm 1 recovers the true importance function. (d)
depicts a ground-truth cost computed with respect to legitimate clients as Sybil nodes dynamically enter the network. Our system (red dotted line) performs
near-optimal even when spoofed clients comprise more than twice the network.
wireless channels in computing α (Sec. §IV). Our client clas-
sifier exhibits consistent performance in both power-scaling
and mobile scenarios with a TPR ≈ 96% and FPR ≈ 4%.
C. Application to Multi-Agent Coverage
We implement the multi-agent coverage problem from [6],
where a team of aerial servers position themselves to min-
imize their distance to client robots at reported positions
pi,i ∈ [c]. We use an importance function ρ(q, P ) = ρ1(q) +
. . . + ρc(q) defined in Sec. §VI where each client term is a
Gaussian-shaped function ρi(q) = exp(− 12 (q − pi)T (q − pi))
(Fig. 9b). An α-modified importance function is implemented
as ρ(q, P )α = α1ρ1(q)+ . . .+αcρc(q) where the α terms are
computed using Algorithm 1 (Fig. 9c).
Method. This experiment was performed in the multipath-rich
indoor testbed. For each experiment we randomly place three
clients in an 8 m x 10 m room with two AscTec quadrotor
servers. Fig. 9(a)-(c) shows one client-server topology where
an adversary spoofs six Sybil clients. Upon convergence, we
measure the distance of each server from an optimal location
in 3 scenarios: 1) a naive system with no security, 2) an oracle
which discards Sybil clients a priori, and 3) our system.
Results: Fig. 9(a)-(c) depicts the converged locations for a
candidate topology in the above three scenarios. We observe
that by incorporating α weights in our controller, our system
approximates oracle performance. Fig. 9d demonstrates the
ability of our system to bound the service cost to near optimal
even as spoofers enter the network (comprising up to 300%).
Aggregate Results: Across multiple topologies and 12 runs,
with no security the maximum distance from each quadrotor
to an oracle solution is on average 3.77 m (stdev: 0.86). Our
system achieves a 0.02 m (stdev: 0.02) average from oracle.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop a new system to guard against the
Sybil attack in multi-robot networks. We derive theoretical
guarantees on the performance of our system, which are
validated experimentally. While this paper has focused on
coverage, it can be readily extended to secure other multi-robot
controllers against Sybil attacks, e.g., unmanned delivery [20],
search-and-rescue [21], and formation control [38]. We note
for future work that our method of detecting spoofed clients
is applicable to servers as well, since they also communicate
wirelessly. Since our approach is based on the fundamental
physics of wireless signals, we believe that it will easily
generalize beyond Sybil attacks to other Wi-Fi based security
issues in robot-swarms such as packet path validation [23] and
detecting packet injection attacks to name a few.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL – PROOFS
Guaranteeing Spoof-Resilient Multi-Robot Networks
This supplementary material provides detailed proofs of the
lemmas and theorems submitted in the original paper. We note
that these lemmas and proofs make the following assumptions
that we repeat here for convenience: (A.1) The signal paths
are independent. (A.2) Errors in azimuth and polar angles
are independent. (A.3) The clients transmit a large number
of packets.
I. LEMMAS
Lemma 1.1: Let ∆θi,∆φi denote the error between the
azimuthal and polar angle of the uncorrelated ith path of a
(potentially multipath) source and the corresponding angles of
the (local) maximum in the profile F (φ, θ), gathered over a
large number of uniformly gathered packets for θ ∈ (10◦, 80◦).
Then for a ∆θi and ∆φi are normally distributed with a mean
0, and expected variance σ2φ and σ
2
θ , respectively, defined
below:
σ2φ = σ
2
θ =
9λ2
8Mpi2r2SNR
Where, λ is the wavelength of the signal, SNR is the signal-
to-noise ratio in the network, M is the number of packets
per-rotation, and r is the distance between the antennas. 
Proof: Cramer-Rao bounds calculate estimated performance
for given geometries of antenna trajectories in an algorithm-
independent manner. It is well-known that algorithms such as
MUSIC achieve the Cramer-Rao bound (CRB) [2, 3, 5]. Using
the result in [5], for a sufficiently large number of packets M ,
the error in angle for the uncorrelated path i using the Cramer-
Rao bound has a mean 0 and variance σ2 where:
σ2 =
1
2SNR
Re
[
D∗D −D∗A(A∗A)−1A∗D]−1 (1)
Where SNR is the signal to noise ratio in the network,
A is the steering vector of the MUSIC algorithm [4] and D
is its derivative with respect to the angle. Let us consider
the quadrotor retrieves samples at a set of uniform angles
{0,∆, 2∆, . . . , (M−1)∆}, where ∆ = 2piM . For the azimuthal
angle, these values are given by:
A = [1, ej
2pir cos φi sin θi
λ , . . . , ej
2pir cos ((M−1)∆−φi) sin θi
λ ]T
D =
[
0, . . .
2pir sin θi sin ((M − 1)∆− φi)
λ
,
×ej 2pir cos ((M−1)∆−φi) sin θiλ
]T
(2)
A∗A = M
D∗A =
M∑
j=1
2pir sin θi
λ
sin ((j − 1)∆− φi)
→ 0 , as M →∞
1
M
D∗D =
[
2pir sin θi
λ
]2 M∑
j=1
sin2((j − 1)∆− φi)
→ 2pi
2r2 sin2 θi
λ2
, as M →∞ (3)
Substituting these values in Eqn. 1, we have:
σ2φ =
(2pi2Mr2 sin2 θi/λ
2)−1
2SNR
=
λ2
4pi2r2M sin2 θiSNR
(4)
Similarly, for the polar angle, we can write:
D =
[
0, . . . ,
2pir cos θi cos ((M − 1)∆− φi)
λ
ej
2pir cos ((M−1)∆−φi) sin θi
λ
]T
D∗A =
M∑
j=1
2pir cos θi
λ
cos ((j − 1)∆− φi)
→ 0 , as M →∞
1
M
D∗D =
[
2pir cos θi
λ
]2 M∑
j=1
cos2((j − 1)∆− φi)
→ 2pi
2r2 cos2 θi
λ2
, as M →∞
Again, substituting these values in Eqn. 1, we have:
σ2θ =
(2pi2Mr2 cos2 θi/λ
2)−1
2SNR
=
λ2
4pi2r2M cos2 θiSNR
(5)
Note that these values for σ2φ and σ
2
θ are defined for
large values of M . Applying the central-limit theorem, it is
well known that the average of any distribution over a large
number of samples is asymptotically normal [1]. As a result,
the distributions of φi and θi are asymptotically normally
distributed with a mean of zero and variance given by Eqn. 4
and Eqn. 5. Assuming θ is uniformly in (10◦, 80◦), and using
the corresponding expected values of 1/ sin2 θi and 1/ cos2 θi
to be 4.5, we have:
σ2φ =
9λ2
8Mpi2r2SNR
σ2θ =
9λ2
8Mpi2r2SNR
This proves the required lemma. 
Lemma 1.2: Let us define g(x; 0, σ2) as
g(x; 0, σ2) =
{√
2pif(x; 0, σ2), if f(x; 0, σ2) < 1√
2pi
.
1, otherwise.
(6)
Where f(x; 0, σ2) is density function of the Gaussian distribu-
tion with mean 0 and variance σ2. Then if the random variable
u is uniformly distributed between and (0, 2pi) and the random
variable n is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
σ2, then their expectations obey the following:
E[g(u)] ≤ √σ
(√
2 +
√
pi
pi
)
(7)
E[g(n)] ≥ 1− σ (8)
Proof: Notice that by the definition of the Gaussian distribu-
tion
√
2pif(x; 0, σ2) < 1 occurs only if:
√
2pi
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
x2
2σ2 < 1 (9)
i.e., e−
x2
2σ2 < σ (10)
x >
√
2σ
√
ln
1
σ
:= S (11)
Let us first evaluate E[g(n)]. We can write this as:
E[g(n)] =
∫ S
−S
f(x; 0, σ2)dx+ 2
√
2pi
∫ −S
−∞
[f(x; 0;σ2)]2dx
≥
∫ S
−S
f(x; 0, σ2)dx = erf
(
S
σ
√
2
)
(12)
≥ 1− erfc
(
S
σ
√
2
)
(13)
≥ 1− σ (From erfc(x) < e−x2 , Eqn. 11) (14)
Where erf(·) is the well known Error function and erfc(·)
is its complement. The error function is related to the
CDF of the normal distribution F (x; 0;σ2) as: F (x) =
1
2
(
1− erfc( −x
σ
√
2
)
)
. Similarly, we can evaluate E[u(n)] as:
E[u(n)] =
∫ S
−S
1
2pi
dx+ 2
√
2pi
∫ −S
−2pi
1
2pi
f(x; 0;σ2)dx
≤ 2S
2pi
+
1√
2pi
F (−S, 0;σ2)
≤ S
pi
+
1√
2pi
erfc(
S
σ
√
2
)
≤ S
pi
+
1√
2pi
e
−S2
2σ2 (from erfc(x) < e−x
2
)
≤ σ
pi
[√
2 ln
1
σ
+
1√
2
]
(using Eqn. 11) (15)
≤ √σ
(√
2 +
√
pi
pi
)
(if σ2 < 2pi) (16)
Eqn. 14 and 16 together prove the lemma. 
Lemma 1.3: Assuming a network of m routers, and a client
i which reports either: 1) Its legitimate location given by
{(θil, φri)}; or 2) A fake (spoofer) location chosen uniformly
at random. Then the corresponding values of βi, i.e. βlegit and
βspoof have an expectation given by:
E[βspoof ] ≤
√σˆθσˆφ(√2 +√pi
pi
)2m (17)
E[βlegit] ≥ 1−mσˆθσˆφ (18)
Where, σˆθ , σˆφ are the variances defined in Lemma 1.1.
Proof: Let us first evaluate the component of βlegit the
confidence metric of a genuine client-i. Let’s assume the
direction of this client closest to its true location from the
profile is (φFil , θFil). Then, the following results hold:
E[Llegit(F1r |(φil, θil)]
= E[g(φFil − φil; 0, σˆ2φ)]E[g(θFil − θil; 0, σˆ2θ)]
= E[g(mil; 0, σˆ2φ)]E[g(nil; 0, σˆ
2
θ)]
≥ (1− σˆθ)(1− σˆφ) ≥ 1− σˆthetaσˆφ (19)
Where mil, nil are normally distributed. We can write the
analogous metric if the client is an adversary as:
E[Lspoof (F1r |(φil, θil)]
= E[g(φFil − φil; 0, σˆ2φ)]E[g(θFil − θil; 0, σˆ2θ)]
= E[g(uil; 0, σˆ2φ)]E[g(vil; 0, σˆ
2
θ)]
≤√σˆθσˆφ(√2 +√pi
pi
)2
(20)
Where uil, vil are uniformly distributed. Generalizing to m
independent routers, we can write:
E[βspoof ] ≤
√σˆθσˆφ(√2 +√pi
pi
)2m (21)
E[βlegit] ≥ (1− σˆθσˆφ)m ≥ 1−mσˆθσˆφ (22)
Eqn. 21 and 22 prove the above Lemma 1.3. 
Lemma 1.4: Assume a network ofm routers serving a client
j. We assume a new client i joins the network, which does
not report its location. Without loss of generality, this client:
1) either spoofs client-j, potentially scaling power, or; 2) a
randomly located legitimate client. Let γspoof , γlegit denote
the second component γij of the confidence metrics measured
in either cases. Then the expected value of these confidence
metrics are bounded by:
E[γspoof ] ≥ 1− 2mkσθσφ (23)
E[γlegit] ≤
√2σθσφ(√2 +√pi
pi
)2mk (24)
Where, σθ , σφ are the variances defined in Lemma 1.1 that
depend on signal-to-noise ratio and k is the number of maxima
in the fingerprint of client i.
Proof: Let us first evaluate the component of γlegit
the confidence metric of a genuine client-i, in relation to
router l and client-j. Let’s assume set of k directions of
this client Φlegit,r = {φlegit,1, . . . , φlegit,k}, Θlegit,r =
{θlegit,1, . . . , θlegit,k} are uniformly at random. For the mo-
ment, let’s consider γlegit pertaining to a legitimate client-i.
Then, the following results hold:
E[Llegit(2 spoofs 1|F1r, F2r)]
=
k∏
p=1
E[g(φlegit,p − φ1,p; 0, 2σ2φ)]E[g(φlegit,p − φ1,p; 0, 2σ2θ)]
=
k∏
p=1
E[g(up; 0, 2σ2φ)]
k∏
p=1
E[g(vp; 0, 2σ2θ)]
≤√2σθσφk(√2 +√pi
pi
)2k
(25)
Where up, vp are uniformly at random as well, and κ is a
constant normalization factor to ensure the likelihood is at
most 1. We can write the analogous metric if client-i is an
adversary as:
E[Lspoof (2 spoofs 1|F1r, F2r]
=
k∏
p=1
E[f(φspoof,p − φ1,p; 0, 2σ2φ)]
× E[f(φspoof,p − φ1,p; 0, 2σ2θ)]
=
k∏
p=1
E[f(mp; 0, 2σ2φ)]
k∏
p=1
E[f(np; 0, 2σ2θ)]
≥ (1−√2σθ)k(1−
√
2σφ)k ≥ 1− 2kσθσφ (26)
Where mp, np are normally distributed. Assuming fingerprints
from routers are independent, we can write the expectations
across routers in the two cases as:
E[γspoof ] ≥ (1 − 2kσθσφ)m ≥ 1− 2mkσθσφ (27)
E[γlegit] ≤
√2σθσφ(√2 +√pi
pi
)2mk (28)
Eqn. 28 and 27 prove the above Lemma 1.4. 
II. THEOREM
Theorem 2.1: Let us consider a network with m servers
and c clients. A new client i either: 1) spoofs s clients
reporting a random location, potentially scaling power, or; 2)
is a randomly located legitimate client. Let αspoof , αlegit be
the confidence metrics measured in either case. Let us assume
that the client obtains its signals from servers along k paths.
We assume: (1) The paths are independent and uncorrelated.
(2) Errors in azimuth and polar angles are independent. (3)
The clients transmit a large number of packets M . Then, the
expected value of these confidence metrics are bounded by:
E[αspoof ] ≤
[√
σˆθσˆφκ
]m
[2mkσθσφ]s
E[αlegit] ≥ 1− cmσˆθσˆφ
[√
2σθσφκ
]mk
Where κ =
(
(
√
2 +
√
pi)/pi
)2
, σθ , σφ, σˆθ , σˆφ are the variances
defined in Lemma 1.1 that depend on signal-to-noise ratio (the
latter include measurement error in reported locations).
Proof: Using Lemma 1.4, we can write:
E[1− γspoof ] ≤ 2mkσθσφ
E[1− γlegit] ≥ 1−
[√
2σθσφκ
]mk
Combining over s spoofers and c − s legitimate clients, we
can write:
E[
∏
i6=j
1− γspoof ] ≤ [2mkσθσφ]s
(
1− (c− s) [√2σθσφκ]mk)
≤ [2mkσθσφ]s
E[
∏
i6=j
1− γlegit] ≥ 1− c
[√
2σθσφκ
]mk
Combining the above equations with Lemma 1.3, we can
write:
E[αspoof ] ≤
[√
σˆθσˆφκ
]m
[2mkσθσφ]s
E[αlegit] ≥ 1− cmσˆθσˆφ
[√
2σθσφκ
]mk
Which proves the required lemma. 
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